This paper investigates the impacts of capital mobility and tax competition in a setting with imperfect matching between firms and workers. The small country attracts less firms than the large one but accommodates a share of the industry that exceeds its capital share -a reverse home market effect. This allows the small country to be more aggressive and to set a higher tax rate than the large one, thus implying that tax competition reduces international inequalities.
Introduction
During the last two decades, OECD countries have experienced very high increases in foreign direct investments (OECD, 2003) . As economic integration gets deeper, these investments are likely to become more responsive to differentials in corporate tax rates. The empirical evidence collected by Mooij and Ederveen (2003) confirms the idea that governments vastly use such an instrument to influence firms' locational choices. Building on that observation, the literature on fiscal competition studies how governments choose their tax rates in order to attract firms (Wilson, 1999) . Because the outcome of fiscal competition crucially hinges on the international mobility of capital, it seems promising and reasonable to build on the microeconomic underpinnings of firms' locational choices.
New economic geography (NEG) aims precisely at explaining how firms do interact to form clusters within a few regions (Fujita et al., 1999; Baldwin et al., 2003) . It is, therefore, natural to tackle the process of fiscal competition by using the main ingredients of NEG, namely increasing returns, market size, and imperfect competition. matching between firms and workers, we find it natural to study how skill mismatch affects the spatial distribution of firms through both firms' locational choices and the working of local labor markets. When the labor force is heterogeneous in the skill space, firms are able to set wages below the marginal productivity of labor by differentiating technologies. Hence, they operate on imperfectly competitive labor markets. As firms also exhibit scale economies at the plant level, it appears that our setting blends the main ingredients of NEG. However, we obtain results that are very different from existing ones.
First, we show that the large country's residents enjoy a higher utility level than do those of the small country. Yet, though the large country has more firms than does the small one, competition on local labor markets hinders the large country to have a more than proportionate share of firms. We thus get a reverse home market effect: the share of firms in the larger region is less than the share of consumers in that region. Put together, the last two results mean that our model encapsulates both the "importance of being small" and the "importance of being large", two aspects that have been emphasized in distinct papers.
Second, the few existing studies focussing on tax competition between asymmetric countries predict that the large country sets a higher corporate tax rate than does the small one (Bucovetsky, This is what we accomplish in this paper where we show that the small country levies higher corporate tax rate than does the large country, the reason being that the small country enjoys a reverse home market effect that allows it to follow a more aggressive tax policy. Hence, by focussing on the microeconomic underpinnings of local labor markets, we are able to establish that the main implication of the above-mentioned studies is reversed. Such a prediction seems to fit well what we observe in the European Union. To see it, consider the six founding EU-members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), the economies of which are fairly well integrated. Figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between the share of corporate taxes in total tax receipts and, respectively, these countries' GDP and population size. Clearly, both relationships are downward sloping and correlations between variables are very high. 1 Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 1 Considering the EU-15 also leads to decreasing relationships. However, the correlation values are lower.
Third, our analysis has three major redistributional implications. The first one is that tax competition leads to redistribution from the large to the small country. This is due to the fact that, because of the reverse home market effect, the small country is able to tax both domestic and foreign capital.
However, the large country always reaches a higher utility level than does the small country. This sharply differs from the result obtained in the existing studies where the small country typically attains higher utility under tax competition (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991) . The next implication is that tax competition reduces international inequalities in the sense that the large country's residents prefer the no-tax outcome, whereas those of the small country are better off under tax competition.
The final implication is that tax harmonization leads to redistribution from the large to the small country. In other words, countries are bound to disagree on the need to allow for tax competition as well as on the choice of a common tax rate.
Our last contribution is methodological in nature. Even in the case of simple games such as those by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) , showing the existence of a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium in tax games is known to be a very problematic issue. 2 Here, we propose a new approach to show that our tax game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It is worth stressing that this is done without imposing ad hoc restrictions. This in turn allows us to compare the fiscal competition outcome to both the autarky and no-tax cases on solid grounds, unlike many existing contributions.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. In section 3, we study the international distribution of capital in the no-tax case, whereas the process of fiscal competition is discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes by discussing extensions and policy implications. 2 So far, the existence of a Nash equilibrium has been proven only in special cases. For example, Laussel and Le Breton (1998) simplify the tax game by ignoring consumers' capital income, whereas Bucovetsky (2003) shows the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a tax game with a continuum of countries. Peralta and van Ypersele (2006) show that a tax competition model with a quadratic production function and a perfectly competitive markets has a Nash equilibrium.
The model and preliminary results
Consider an economy formed by two countries, labeled 1 and 2, and a total mass L of consumers.
There are two production factors, labor and capital. National capital endowments are evenly owned by local workers, who inelastically supply one unit of labor each. The unit of capital is chosen for each worker to own a single unit of capital. Our modeling strategy thus abstracts from redistributional issues between capital-owners and workers. Because most FDI takes place in countries with similar technologies and factor endowments (think of the OECD countries), we abstract from comparative advantage of both the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin types. However, although many models of fiscal competition assume that competing jurisdictions have the same size, countries involved in FDI often differ in terms of market sizes. Let θ ∈ (0, 1) denote the share of consumers in country 1, which implies that θ also measures that country's shares of labor and capital. Let l 1 = θL and l 2 = (1− θ)L denote the mass of consumers in countries 1 and 2, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that l 1 ≥ l 2 . Throughout this paper, we refer to θ and to (1 − θ) as being the size of countries 1 and 2. Unless explicitly mentioned, we consider asymmetric countries with θ > 1/2, thus implying that country 1 (2) is the large (small) country. Consumers are immobile and can supply labor only in the country in which they reside, so that labor markets are local. By contrast, consumers are free to supply capital wherever they want.
Firm technology and labor market friction
The industry is formed by heterogeneous firms that supply a homogeneous good sold in each country on a competitive market. This good can be shipped at zero cost between the two countries so that the law of one price holds; we take it as the numéraire. In other words, product market conditions do not influence firms' locational choices. This somewhat extreme assumption is made to capture the idea that economic integration weakens the relative influence of product market competition on firms' location, whereas it exacerbates the effect of costs differences of immobile factors. It is worth stressing, however, that introducing positive transport costs for the final good does not change our main results provided that these costs are sufficiently low. 3 Each firm has a single plant that uses both capital and labor as inputs; its cost function is given by C(q) = fr + cwq, where f is the fixed requirement of capital and c the marginal requirement of labor; r and w are the rate of return of capital and the wage rate, which are both endogenous.
To ease the burden of notation, we normalize both f and c to one. At this stage, one may wonder if our assumption of a perfectly competitive product market is compatible with that of increasing returns at the firm level. As we will see later, we consider imperfect competition on the labor market in which firms pay wages lower than the marginal productivity of labor. Thus, firms make positive operating profits that allow them to cover their payment for their fixed requirement of capital.
Each firm uses a specific technology in the sense that workers can produce only when they perfectly match the firm's skill needs. Workers have a priori heterogeneous skills, so that they have different matches with a firm's job offer. Thus, if firm k hires a worker whose skill differs from x k , the worker must get trained and her cost of training to meet the firm's skill requirement is a function of the difference between the worker's skill x and the firm k's skill requirement x k .
In describing the heterogeneity of workers, we follow Kim (1989) and others by assuming that the skill space is described by the circumference C of a circle. As our main focus is about the impact of country size on the international distribution of capital under different scenarios, we also assume that the two countries have the same skill space; we normalize the length of C to one. Individuals' skills are continuously and uniformly distributed along this circumference; the density is constant in country i and denoted by l i . Hence, the value of l i measures the size of the local labor market.
There are n i firms in country i, with n 1 + n 2 = L. Firms' job requirements x k are equally spaced along the circumference C so that 1/n i is the distance between two adjacent firms in the skill space.
The training cost function is β |x − x k |, where β expresses the ability of a worker to learn how to adjust to a technology different from her skill. After training, all workers are identical from the firm's viewpoint since their ex post productivity is observable and equal to 1 by normalization (thus, there is no moral hazard problem within firms).
We assume that firms are not able to observe each worker's skill type, perhaps because both labor markets are thick. 4 Firms know only the distribution of x. However, workers know their own types and observe the firms' skill needs. In order to induce the appropriate set of workers to take jobs with the most suitable firm, workers must therefore pay at least some part of the training cost.
In addition, since the supply of a worker is inelastic, firms cannot offer a wage menu so that the worker must pay for all the costs of training, which are not observable to the firm (hence resolving the adverse selection problem). Consequently, workers must pay their entire training costs, whereas each firm i offers the same wage to all its workers, conditional on the worker having been trained to the skill x i . Each worker then compares the wage offers of firms and the required training costs; she simply chooses to work for the firm offering the highest wage net of training costs (Hamilton et al., 2000) .
Suppose that firm k is located in country i. When firms on each side of k offer wages w i,k−1 and w i,k+1 , firm k's labor pool consists of two subsegments whose outer boundaries are x i,k and x i,k+1 .
The worker at x i,k receives the same net wage from firm k and firm k −1, whereas the worker at x i,k+1 receives the same net wage from firm k and firm k+1. Because firm k knows the training cost function and all firms' skill requirements, it can determine x i,k and x i,k+1 as the solutions to the two equations
Hence, we have
We choose the unit of the homogeneous good for each worker to produce one unit of good. Firm 4 When firms are able to observe worker's skill type, our main results, especially those regarding the reverse home market effect, are likely to be the same. Indeed, firms have to bear the training costs, thus implying that it is less profitable for firms to enter the economy (Hamilton et al., 2000) . Because the incentives to enter are the same in the two countries, their relative attractiveness should be unaffected. k's profits are then given by
where r i is the price of capital and w i,k the wage firm k pays when it is located in country i.
In the rest of this section, we focus on our benchmark case in which capital is immobile. The output being sold at the same price, the trade balance implies that each country consumes only its own production. Accordingly, our benchmark case may be referred to as the autarky case. The amount of capital available in country i being l i , capital market clearing implies that the number of firms in country i is fixed and given by
where the superscript a stands for the autarky case. This in turn implies that the large country has a larger number of firms than does the small (n a 1 > n a 2 ).
Equilibrium factor prices
We first determine the equilibrium values of w i,k . The trade-off that allows us to determine the equilibrium wage is straightforward (see (4)). Everything else being equal, higher wages lead to lower profits because the wage bill rises. However, higher wages also foster higher profits by attracting more workers, hence yielding a larger output. These two effects are balanced at the equilibrium wage rate, which may be found by taking the first-order condition for π i,k with respect to w i,k :
This wage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric (Hamilton et al., 2000) . It then follows from (1), (4), and
which is positive as long as β < (1 − θ)L, a condition we assume to hold throughout the rest of the paper. Thus, the equilibrium wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labor after training, minus a premium that local firms are able to levy because workers cannot move costlessly from one firm to another. Note that this premium is required for each firm to be able to cover its (endogenous) fixed capital cost. As expected, it decreases as the number of firms located in country i rises because firms have less monopsony power on the labor market.
Substituting w * i,k into (2), we get
All else the same, individual profits decrease with the country size.
It remains to describe how the price of capital is determined. As usual, we assume that there is free entry and exit in the industry. Consequently, competition for capital among entrepreneurs implies that rental rates exactly absorb firms' operating profits, so that r i must be such that π * i,k = 0. This yields the equilibrium price of capital in country i:
Thus, the price of capital in autarky is
As a larger country allows firms to earn lower operating profits under autarky, the price of capital is lower in the large country than in the small one.
We are now equipped to describe the two main effects at work in our setting. On the one hand, when the size l i of a country increases, it becomes more profitable to firms because a larger labor pool allows them to hire more workers, whence to produce and sell more. We refer to that as the market size effect. On the other hand, a larger labor market also leads to more firms and, therefore, to lower average training costs. This reduces the monopsony power of firms, thus implying that they have to pay higher wages. We call this force the labor-market crowding effect. Expressions (6) and (8) show that the latter effect always dominates the former when there is autarky.
The indirect utility of an individual of skill type x working for firm k in country i is given by
which is equal to
Individual utilities being quasi-linear, we may add them up to define the social surplus. Then, the average utility of firm k's employees is
.
Because x i,k+1 = x i,k + 1/2n i and x i,k = x i,k − 1/2n i at the symmetric equilibrium, we have
In this expression, the second term represents the effect of improving the quality match. When the number of local firms rises, the average mismatch decreases, implying that the equilibrium wage increases. However, as shown by (7), an increase in the number of firms also leads to a lower capital price. Thus, the total impact of the number of firms on welfare is a priori ambiguous.
Under autarky, it follows from (3), (8) and (10) that
Hence, the large country's residents are better off than those of the small country. Note that this welfare gap is a reflection of the presence of aggregate increasing returns. Furthermore, the welfare gap rises as the share of the large country in the global economy increases since
Summarizing the foregoing discussion, we have: Proposition 1 When capital is immobile, consumers reach a higher utility level in the large country.
Furthermore, the larger the difference in size, the larger the gap in individual welfare levels between the two countries.
Capital mobility
In this section, we allow for capital mobility so that the number of firms located in a country is no longer tied to the amount of local capital. A spatial equilibrium is such that no agent has an incentive to change her international allocation of capital and such that no firm has an incentive to enter or exit the market. These two conditions will hold when no agent can get a higher rental rate by relocating her capital and when rental rates exactly absorb firms' operating profits. A spatial equilibrium is the outcome of the following two opposite forces: the market size effect has the nature of an attraction force, whereas the labor-market crowding effect acts as a repulsion force. In what follows, we restrict our analysis to the meaningful case of interior spatial equilibria only.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that the number of firms is sufficiently large to avoid the integer problem; we thus treat n i as a positive real number.
The free market outcome
When capital is mobile, it flows to the country with higher capital price and arbitrage induces the capital prices in both countries to be the same: 5
Using (7), this equilibrium condition can be rewritten as follows:
so that n * 1 > n * 2 if and only if l 1 > l 2 , whereas
allows us to determine the equilibrium number of firms in country i:
where the superscript m stands for the case of mobile capital.
Using l 1 = θL and l 2 = (1 − θ)L, the corresponding value of the price of capital is then obtained by substituting (12) into (7):
which is a decreasing and concave function of θ over the interval (1/2, 1). In other words, increasing the relative size of the large country decreases the interest rate at a decreasing rate.
As expected, once the two countries have different sizes, the mobility of capital generates a distribution of firms that differs from the one arising under autarky. A key-question is whether the mobility of capital strengthens or reduces international inequality. Comparing (3) and (12), it is readily verified that
Thus, capital is exported from the large country to the small country. This implies that capital mobility between asymmetric countries leads to a more dispersed international allocation of capital.
This should not come as a surprise since, under autarky, the price of capital is higher in the small country than in the large one.
Yet, the large country retains a larger number of firms than the small one, n m 1 > n m 2 . This is because the equalization of profits between countries implies that the market size effect generated by the large country has to be exactly offset by a stronger labor-market crowding effect. For that, it must be that the large country hosts more firms than the small country. Putting all these results together, we obtain the following ranking:
We now want to determine whether the equilibrium outcome exhibits a "home market effect".
According to Helpman and Krugman (1985) , when the industry is characterized by scale economies at the firm level and imperfect competition, the large country would attract a more than proportionate share of firms. Define the share of firms in country 1 as λ = n m 1 /L. It then follows immediately from
Accordingly, we have To understand the main forces at work, consider the following thought experiment. Under autarky, (2) implies that firms located in the large country enjoy higher profits gross of fixed cost than firms set up in the small one. Assume now that capital becomes mobile but that wages remain fixed in both countries. The gross profit differential thus triggers a flow of capital from the small country to the large one. As a result, the share of firms installed in the large country exceeds its share of capital. In other words, other things the same, the large market would attract a more than proportionate share of the industry. However, when more (less) firms set up in the large (small) country, wages are not constant. They increase in the large country due to the labor-market crowding effect and decrease in the small one. Our result shows that this effect is sufficiently strong to overcome the market size effect, thus giving rise to what we may call a "reverse home market effect" (in short RHME). 6 Several comments are in order. First, our result cannot be dismissed on the grounds that we have assumed zero transport cost for firms' output. Indeed, everything hold true when such costs are positive but not too high. This is because the foregoing inequalities are strict and will remain valid in the presence of a small price wedge on the homogenous good market. Stated differently, combining scale economies, imperfect competition and transport costs may well yield a RHME. 6 Formally, as shown by (11), the market size effect is proportional to the number of firms, whereas the labor-market crowding effect is proportional to the square of the number of firms. This makes the large country relatively less attractive to firms. Clearly, this argument depends on the fact that our model is linear. For the same reason, we may conjecture that the results derived here are robust against alternative specifications that are not too nonlinear.
Second, we want to stress the fact that the home market effect is typically derived in settings in which wages are fixed and determined in another sector operating under constant returns and perfect competition (Head et al., 2002) . In such a context, the market size effect is the only one at work, thus entailing a more than proportionate share of firms in the large country. However, frictions on the labor market may overcome this effect. They are, therefore, likely to play an important role in the determination of the industry structure and the effects of the liberalization of capital movements.
In particular, we may expect imperfect matching on the labor market could slow down the possible agglomeration of firms in a few regions, at least when workers are spatially immobile. 7 Third, it is hard to believe that such a difference in results is due to the sole existence of strategic interactions in our setting. Indeed, as shown by Head et al. (2002) , strategic competition on the product market does not invalidate the home market effect. Instead, this suggests that, under imperfect competition, product-market and input-market analyses need not lead to similar conclusions.
Last, the foregoing result sheds light on the fact that the evidence regarding the presence of the home market effect in real-world data is described as being "highly mixed" by Head and Mayer Our main results may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 When capital is mobile, the large country accommodates more firms than the small country, but its industry share is less than its capital share.
Furthermore, it is readily verified that dλ/dθ < 1 over a large interval of θ-values, which implies that the gap θ − λ expands. In this case, increasing the relative size of the large country exacerbates 7 Amiti and Pissarides [1] consider labor heterogeneity in a monopolistic competition model of trade. However, their setting is different from ours along the following lines: (i) firms can observe workers' skill characteristics and, whence, discriminate workers with respect to wage payment; (ii) there is inter-sectoral mobility of workers. Amiti and Pissarides then show that these two assumptions lead firms to pay a constant average wage to skilled workers. This prevents the emergence of a labor-market crowding effect. the RHME. However, when θ becomes very large (& 0.893), the gap θ − λ shrinks, thus showing that the RHME is not necessarily magnified by the market size effect.
Finally, as the small country imports capital, both countries face different incentives to tax firms.
We will see in section 4 how this is reflected in the tax outcome.
The welfare implications of capital mobility
The equilibrium distribution of firms minimizes total training costs in the global economy. Indeed, total training costs are given by
The first order condition for the minimization of T with respect to n 1 and n 2 , taking n 1 + n 2 = L into account, yields (11) . Note that the net output of the global economy is L − T (n 1 , n 2 ).
Hence, the equilibrium distribution of firms maximizes the net output of the global economy. Thus, despite imperfect competition on local labor markets, the international allocation of capital is globally efficient under free mobility, as in standard neoclassical models. However, it generates redistributive effects between the two countries.
To see how, we compare the welfare levels reached in each country at the market outcome with and without capital mobility. From r 1 = r 2 and (12), the utility difference across countries in the mobile capital case is given by
as long as θ > 1/2. Such a welfare gap finds its origin in the fact that the large country has a larger number of firms, which implies higher wages and lower training costs (see (5) and (10)). Furthermore, it also rises as the size discrepancy increases.
Turning to comparisons of welfare under mobility and autarky, standard calculations show that
As θ > 1/2 and, hence, l 1 > l 2 , this implies that
Hence, the large country always gains from capital mobility. Though intuitive, this result is not totally immediate. Indeed, country 1's residents get higher capital incomes because its price rises when it can be invested abroad, but they earn lower wages because the number of local firms is lower.
The implications of capital mobility for the small country are even less straightforward. Because This may be understood as follows. When capital is mobile, the global output net of training costs increases and reaches its maximum at the equilibrium distribution of firms. However, these gains need not benefit each country as some firms move to the small country. In the large country, capital income rises but its labor income falls, whereas these two effects go in the opposite direction in the small country. In the large country, the gains resulting from the higher price of capital for country 1's residents always more than compensate their wage decrease. This is because the large country hosts more firms than the small one, thus making the marginal impact of the labor-market crowding effect weak enough because labor markets are local, whereas the marginal impact of the capital price remains strong enough because the capital market is fully integrated. In the small country, consumers earn higher wages under capital mobility than under autarky (see Figure 3 ). Whether these gains are large enough to compensate for the lower price of capital now depends on the relative size of the two countries. As the large country gets bigger and bigger, the wage level in the small country goes down, but its decrease is sharper under autarky than under capital mobility. Consequently, when θ is sufficiently large, the gains in wage income may compensate the loss in capital income. By contrast, when country sizes are similar, such a compensation is no longer possible. This shows that country size matters in the sense that capital mobility may exacerbate international inequalities.
This is a second degree inequality that is satisfied on the unit interval if and only if
Insert Figure 3 about here
Capital taxation
In this section, we study the effects of tax competition on the location of firms. Because our main focus is on the impact of fiscal competition on the location of firms, we disregard the possible inefficiency of public goods provision and assume that national governments tax capital to make their residents better off. More precisely, we consider two national governments that maximize the welfare of their residents. Following a well-established tradition in fiscal competition (Cremer and Pestieau, 2004),
we assume a per-unit capital tax. It is the only instrument available to each government, which redistributes the proceeds to their residents. In addition, each government is subject to a budgetbalance constraint.
We consider a two-stage game in which national governments, first, choose simultaneously their tax level and, then, firms enter the market, decide where to locate and pay the corresponding wage.
From now on, we will refer to the first stage game as the tax game. The equilibrium concept we adopt is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As usual, the model is solved by backward induction.
The tax game
Let t i denote the per-unit capital tax rate in country i and s i the transfer to the residents of this country. 8 In such a context, the profit of a firm (6) and the utility level of a worker (10) become:
Consider the second stage subgame induced by s i and t i (i = 1, 2). The capital price in each country is then given by
Free entry and the equalization of capital prices then lead to the equilibrium condition for the second stage:
Given n 1 +n 2 = L, it is readily verified that this equation has a single solution n * 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) and n * 2 (t 1 , t 2 ).
The implicit function theorem implies that these two functions are continuous with respect to t 1 and t 2 . To ease the burden of notation, we denote these functions n 1 and n 2 .
Let us now focus on the tax game. Country i's government, which fully anticipates the influence of its decision on the resulting distribution of firms determined by (17) , maximizes (15) with respect to s i and t i under the budget constraint
Substituting (16) and s i l i = t i n i into (15), we obtain
which is a continuous function of t i and t j . Substituting n j = L − n i into (17), we get
which is a continuous function of t i and t j . Thus, the welfare problem of government i is modeled as a game in which this government maximizes (18) with respect to t i , subject to the constraint (19) .
Totally differentiating g(t i , n i ; t j ) for a given t j yields
Applying the first-order condition to V i and using dn i /dt i yields the following expression:
A similar argument holds for country j 6 = i.
Substituting (21) for i = 1, 2 into (19), rearranging terms, and using (22), (19) may be rewritten as follows:
Because (23) encapsulates both the equilibrium conditions of each government and the constraint (19) , a Nash equilibrium (t * 1 , t * 2 ) of the tax game (if any) must satisfy (23) where
The following result is shown in Appendix A.
Proposition 4
The tax game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Having done that, we first characterize the equilibrium distribution of firms at the tax equilibrium (the proof is given in Appendix B).
Proposition 5
The large country has more firms at the tax-game outcome than at the no-tax outcome, but the reverse home market effect is still present.
Thus, tax competition weakens the RHME generated by the market forces. In other words, if tax competition affects the international distribution of capital, it does not change its structural
properties. In particular, this proposition implies that
and
where the superscript g represents the capital mobile case with active national governments.
Let us now come to the equilibrium tax rates. Since n 1 + n 2 = N can be rewritten as
Combining (26) with (21), we then obtain our first result about tax rates:
Moreover, it follows from (25) that
2 . This and (23) thus yields
Thus, (17) implies that
So far, we do not know whether or not t * 1 is positive. The following numerical example, in which L = 1 and β = 0.1, suffices to show that country 1 may choose to tax or to subsidy capital according to its relative size. Indeed, we see from Figure 4 that the tax rate decreases and that taxation is replaced by subvention once θ exceeds 0.84 < 0.893 < 0.9. 9 The RHME being exacerbated over the interval [0.5, 0.893], country 1 reacts by subsidizing capital. 9 Thus, the condition β < (1 − θ)L is satisfied.
Insert Figure 4 about here
We may summarize our results as follows.
Proposition 6
At the tax-game outcome, the government of the small country always taxes firms.
However, the government of the large country either subsidies or taxes firms. When it taxes firms, its tax level is always lower than the one chosen by the government of the small country.
One can think of this result as follows. At the no-tax outcome, the large country exports capital and is, therefore, less induced to tax it because the subsidy each of its workers gets is s 1 = t 1 n 1 /l 1 < t 1 .
The reverse holds in the small country where s 2 = t 2 n 2 /l 2 > t 2 , thus implying that the it has more incentives to tax capital. This effect is in turn reinforced by the fact that wages increase in the capital exporting country and decrease in the capital importing one. The same holds when the RHME is still present at the tax outcome, which is precisely what we have shown above. In game-theoretic terms, our result may be explained by means of best reply functions. Numerical simulations indicate that the best reply of the large country is upward slopping: when the small country raises its tax rate, the large one capitalizes on the market size effect to follow suit. By contrast, the best reply of the small country is downward slopping. Whenever the large country decreases its tax rate, the small country may afford to increase its own rate because of the RHME. In other words, the fact that the small country imports capital at the no-tax outcome allows it to build on this comparative advantage to design a more aggressive tax policy that balances the marginal gain of a tax rise and the marginal cost of losing firms.
The foregoing proposition is to be contrasted to those obtained in models with imperfect compe- firms in which the large country is relatively more attractive than the small one. Accordingly, the small country must offer a lower tax rate than does the large country in order to counterbalance the comparative advantage of the large country. It is worth stressing that such a result hinges on the presence of a home market effect. In our model, the labor-market crowding effect dominates the market size effect, thus making the large country relatively less attractive than the small one. This in turn allows the small country to set a higher tax rate than the large country.
Tax competition versus tax coordination
It remains to compare the welfare level reached in each country at the tax-competition and no-tax (efficient) outcomes. Consider, first, the case of cooperation between governments. Using (18) and (19), it is straightforward that the average utility level in the global economy is given by
As seen in the previous section, T is minimized in the no-tax case. Consequently, cooperation leads to the same outcome as in the no-tax case.
Comparing utilities in two countries, we show in Appendix C that
which means that , under tax competition, the large country's residents attains higher utility than do the small country's residents. Moreover, we also show in Appendix C that
As the allocation of capital ceases to be efficient under tax competition, it must be that
Our results may then be summarized as follows.
Proposition 7 Under tax competition, the large country's residents are always better off than the small country's residents. Yet, the large country's residents are always better off at the no-tax outcome, whereas the small country's residents prefer the tax-game outcome.
Despite the RHME, in the absence of tax competition, the inhabitants of the large country are always better off than those of the small one (Proposition 1). Tax competition reduces this welfare gap by allowing the small country to implement a more generous redistribution policy, which relies itself on the RHME generated by the labor-market crowding effect (Proposition 2). However, the small country still preserves part of its attractiveness by not overshooting.
Again, country size matters in the sense that fiscal competition reduces international inequalities once it is recognized that the location of firms is more driven by labor market than product market
considerations. This confirms what we have seen in the foregoing, namely the existing contributions that point to the advantage of being large in tax competition rests on the home market effect. By contrast, our setting uncovers the advantage being small in a framework involving increasing returns and labor market friction, two pervasive features of modern economies.
It remains to consider the effect of tax harmonization, that is, the two countries set the same tax rate t on capital. Because (17) is reduced to (11) , the distribution of firms is the same as in the free market outcome. Therefore, there is no distortion in the sense that the net global output is maximized. This is not the end of the story, however. Indeed, it follows from (18) that tax harmonization has redistributional effects. Specifically, a resident of country i gains (or loses) from tax harmonization by an amount equal to
Expressions (25) and (26) then imply that ∆ 1 < 0 and ∆ 2 > 0. Consequently, we have:
Proposition 8 A move from tax competition to tax harmonization leads to income redistribution from the large to the small country.
As expected, under tax harmonization, the large country loses firms and income. However, because the net global output is maximized, this implies that the small country gains from tax harmonization. Again, this points to the existence of conflicting interests between countries of different sizes when they have to agree about the possible harmonization of capital taxation.
Concluding remarks
We have obtained new results in tax competition in an otherwise standard model, which goes back at least to Salop (1979) . Whereas the large country has more firms per capita than does the small country both under tax competition and tax cooperation in Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005), we have seen that the large country always exports capital toward the small one. This is because we have a RHME, whereas the home market effect holds in Ottaviano and van Ypersele. This shows that the way firms choose their location is crucial in assessing the merits of tax competition. Stated differently, uncovering the various mechanisms that drive the mobility of firms across countries is needed to understand the possible implications of fiscal competition.
An interesting implication of our framework is to shed light on the fact that fiscal competition might well trigger unemployment in a country. To see it, consider an economic environment in which some workers might not take a job, the setting being otherwise similar to the one described above. Specifically, we assume that workers get the same level of unemployment benefit b > 0 when unemployed. This implies that a worker supplies labor provided that her wage net of training costs is greater than or equal to b. Thisse and Zenou (2000) then show that the labor market equilibrium involves unemployment in country i when 1 < b + β/n i holds, namely when the number of firms located in this country is sufficiently small. In this case, the most distant workers on the skill circle refrain from working, thus implying that each firm acts as a monopsony in the labor market. Thus, capital mobility could foster unemployment in the large country that now has a smaller number of firms, thus qualifying Proposition 3. On the other hand, as fiscal competition leads to a reduction in the number of firms installed in the small country when compared to the no-tax case, it is now the small country that could experience unemployment at the taxation outcome, thus qualifying Proposition 7.
At least three possible extensions are worth mentioning. First, countries could use the tax proceeds to subsidize workers' training. In such a context, training costs would become lower and wages higher. However, lower training costs would make the corresponding country less attractive by reducing firms' market power on the labor market. The following question thus suggests itself:
to which extent does one country subsidy its labor force more than the other, and get a better trained labor force, according to its size? Second, introducing capital accumulation with the aim of studying the relationship between economic growth and skill mismatch appears to be a fairly natural topic to investigate. Last, some empirical evidence suggests that several countries tax discriminate between local and foreign firms instead of applying the same tax rate as in this paper (Huizinga and Nicodème, 2005) . It would be interesting to revisit our model when national governments may use such additional instruments. These topics are left for future investigation.
[31] Zodrow, G. R., Mieszkowski, P., 1986. Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics 19, 356-370.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 4
The proof involves four steps.
Step 1. The condition (23) has a unique solution
Substituting n 2 = L − n 1 into (23), we see that both the left hand side (LHS) and the right hand side (RHS) of (23) depend on n 1 . The LHS is negative and increases in n 1 in the interval (0, 8l 1 /7), and is positive in (8l 1 /7, L]. Moreover, it is readily verified that lim n 1 →0 LHS = −∞ and
, and is negative and decreasing in n 1 in (L − 8l 2 /7, L). We also have RHS| n 1 =L−8l 2 /7 = 0 and lim
is readily verified that there exists a unique n 1 that satisfies (23) . Combining this with (21) shows that there exists a unique point (n * 1 , t * 1 , t * 2 ) for which both the first-order conditions dV 1 /dt 1 = 0
and dV 2 /dt 2 = 0 and the equalization of capital prices (19) hold. Note also that this equilibrium (if it exists) is such that n * i > 0 for i = 1, 2. Hence, the tax game has at most one interior Nash equilibrium.
Step 2. The function
For that, we show that the second-order condition is always satisfied at any point for which both the first-order conditions of the two countries (dV 1 /dt 1 = 0 and dV 2 /dt 2 = 0) and the equalization of capital prices (19) hold. In doing so, we use the facts that conditions (24) , (25) , (26) and (27) must hold at any solution to (23) , which will be shown in Appendix B.
It follows from (19) that n i , hence V i , is twice continuously differentiable with respect to t i :
The first-order condition for the maximization of V i with respect to t i is
whereas the second-order derivative of V i with respect to t i yields
Using (A1) and (A2), d 2 V i /dt 2 i may then be rewritten as follows:
where
implying that
so that
It then follows from (24) and (27) that
which in turn implies that
Similarly, (24) and (27) yields
which, combined with (26), implies that
For i = 2, (26) implies that
Hence, we obtain
Similarly, (A4) and (26) lead to
From (A1), (A3) and (A5) to (A7), it then follows that
so that the second-order condition is satisfied for each i = 1, 2. Because Step 1 has shown that there exists a unique t * i that satisfies dV i /dt i = 0 for given t * j , V i (t i , t * j ) is quasi-concave w.r.t. t i .
Step 3. The behavior of dV i /dt i when t i → ±∞ For t * j given, it follows from
that n i is a continuously differentiable function of t i ∈ (−∞, ∞). Furthermore, it follows immediately from this equation that (i) lim t i →∞ n i = 0, (ii) lim t i →∞ t i n 3 i = 0, (iii) lim t i →−∞ n i = L, and (iv)
Using (20), we get
To study the behavior of dV i /dt i when t i → ∞, it is convenient to rewrite it as follows:
It is then readily verified that
These two conditions together with Step 2 implies that V i (t i , t * j ) is maximized at t * i . In other words, (t * 1 , t * 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the tax game.
Step 4. Corner solutions It remains to consider the cases of corner solutions in which one country has no firms (n i = 0).
Two cases may arise. In the former, a country sets a tax rate sufficiently high for all the firms to be established in the other country. Clearly, such a strategy is never optimal from this country's point of view. In the latter, a country gives a sufficiently high subsidy to attract all firms. Again, this cannot happen in equilibrium because the other government would reduce its tax rate. Thus, (t * 1 , t * 2 )
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the tax game. Q.E.D.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 5
From (23), we have µ n
From (12), we also have
Let us define γ as follows:
Step 1 in Appendix A implies that L − 8l 2 /7 < n g 1 < L < 8l 1 /7. This and n 2 = L − n 1 imply that 7/8 − l i /n g i < 0 for i = 1, 2, and that γ > 0. (B1) and (B2) yield
Now assume that γ ≥ 1. This implies that 7/8 − l 1 /n g 1 ≥ 7/8 − l 2 /n g 2 , which is reduced to n g 1 /l 1 ≥ n g 2 /l 2 . However, since γ ≥ 1 and l 1 > l 2 , (B3) yields n g 2 /l 2 > n g 1 /l 1 , which is a contradiction.
Therefore, it must be true that γ < 1. This means 7/8 − l 2 /n 
